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ABSTRACT
This article argues that there are some quick regulatory fixes the Treasury can implement to ensure that tax-
exempt organizations are operating within the rules and that aggressive tax planning is not being used as a
way to obfuscate rules for political organizations requiring disclosure. The article recommends that Treas-
ury promulgate new regulations to require disclosure by tax-exempt entities of expenditures and contribu-
tions in excess of $25,000. The article also proposes that Treasury institute procedures to require tax-exempt
organizations to file for exempt status, and to provide procedures for ensuring that these organizations meet
the requirements in the statute and are not being used as a mechanism to avoid disclosure provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code.
In the campaign finance area, money is oftenanalogized to water. The idea is that ‘‘money, like
water, has to go somewhere.’’1 If money influences
outcomes, political operatives will find the best out-
let, within the current regulatory framework, to
spend money and influence elections.2 Continuing
this analogy, campaign finance laws can be seen
as the regulatory plumbing that helps direct the
flow of money in a way that promotes democratic
ideals. The fact that money will always find an out-
let makes it even more important that we have a
sound plumbing system designed to avoid a flood.
In recent years, we have seen a major effort by inde-
pendent groups (IGs) to manipulate the tax classifi-
cation of their organizations to avoid disclosure
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code and in
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). This
manipulation, coupled with an often deadlocked
Federal Election Commission (FEC) that has been
unable or unwilling to strongly enforce disclosure
provisions, has created an environment where huge
sums of undisclosed contributions are entering the
system. Creating secret entities with secret contribu-
tors poses serious problems for our current regulatory
framework, and is contrary to the intent of Congress
in its creation of the current regulatory regime.
For years, political campaign operatives advising
IGs interested in influencing elections have been
examining campaign finance laws, and advising cli-
ents on the best means of achieving their ends. Even
before the recent decision in Citizens United, which
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1Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1708
(1999)(‘‘Political money, like water, has to go somewhere’’);
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 224
(2003)(‘‘Money, like water, will always find an outlet’’);
Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional
Choice, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 625, 681 (2007)(describing ‘‘trickle’’
of funds from 527s to 501(c)(4)).
2Issacharoff and Karlan, supra note 1, at 1709.
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found unconstitutional a statute banning corpora-
tions and unions from using their treasury funds to
engage in independent campaign expenditures,
IGs were examining ways to have an even greater
impact on elections. The most recent trend is for
IGs to organize as section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations and thus avoid the disclosure provi-
sions that apply to section 527 tax-exempt political
organizations. I have argued elsewhere that propo-
nents of using section 501(c)(4)s as vehicles for
independent political advocacy are taking a very
aggressive position with regard to the status of their
organizations, and that these organizations should
not necessarily be treated as section 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations.3 But even if these
organizations are properly organized as section
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, the existing
regulatory structure never envisioned the massive
use of section 501(c)(4) organizations as a means
of avoiding the disclosure of huge donations
designed to influence elections. Here I argue that
there are some quick regulatory repairs that the
Treasury Department can take to ensure that section
501(c)(4) organizations, as well as labor unions
(x501(c)(5) organizations) and business leagues
(x501(c)(6) organizations), are operating within
the rules, but also to ensure that the policies behind
the regulation of tax-exempt entities and political
campaign intervention are coherent, instructive,
and fair.4
In the 111th Congress, supporters of campaign
finance disclosure proposed the DISCLOSE Act
(Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections Act), which among other
things required disclosure of contributions and
expenditures with regard to independent expendi-
tures.5 The legislation passed the House but the
bill was filibustered in the Senate, and the Senate
failed to invoke cloture on the bill.6 Absent further
action by Congress, the Treasury should promulgate
updated regulations regarding tax-exempt entities,
including filing and disclosure provisions, designed
to create coherent tax-exempt regulations, protect
against abuse of tax-exempt status, and to promote
the important government interests of voter infor-
mation and lack of corruption in our democratic
institutions.
The first part of this article summarizes the basic
law regulating tax-exempt organizations involved in
political campaigns. Part II discusses the current
regulatory regime and the Treasury’s authority to
issue regulations addressing deficiencies in the cur-
rent regime. Part III proposes ways the Treasury can
improve the regulation of tax-exempt campaign
entities without further action by Congress. I
argue that further regulation by the Treasury is nec-
essary, especially in the disclosure context, to
ensure that the regulatory structure applicable to
tax-exempt organizations is enforced in a coherent
way consistent with Congress’s intent.7
I. CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
The law treats groups of people organized to
carry on a group activity in different ways. When
groups organize, accept money, and pool resources,
the government attempts to characterize these orga-
nizations so it can regulate and tax the activities of
the organization. The tax code and state laws pro-
vide for a multitude of different organizational
forms. Congress has created a group of organiza-
tions that for tax and other reasons it deems should
be tax-exempt. These are organizations that are
generally not engaged in business activities and,
3Donald B. Tobin, The Rise of 501(c)(4)s in Campaign Activity:
Are They as Clever as They Think?, Election Law@Moritz,
Commentary, Oct. 5, 2010, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election
law/comments/index.php?ID = 7667.
4This article focuses mainly on the regulation of 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations, rather than organizations orga-
nized under 501(c)(5) (labor unions) and (c)(6) (business
leagues). The reforms discussed in this article could, however,
also be applied to those organizations.
5H.R. 5175, 111th Congress (2010); S. 3628, 111th Congress
(2010).
6The cloture motion to cut off debate requires sixty votes. There
were only fifty-nine votes for cloture. See 156 Cong. Rec.
S7383 (Sept. 23, 2010).
7This article deals only with the regulation of tax-exempt enti-
ties. As discussed infra Part III.C, I recognize that further reg-
ulation in this area may encourage people to use for-profit
corporations as a way of avoiding disclosure, although the reg-
ulation of for-profit corporations’ campaign activities is outside
the scope of this article. For an examination of the use of for-
profit corporations as a means of avoiding some campaign
finance laws see Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Tax-
able Entities: Are They the Next ‘‘Loophole’’?, 6 First
Amend. L. Rev. 41 (2007). The benefits of using a for-profit
corporation have only increased since Citizens United and at
least one recent report indicates that individuals are using tax-
able entities as a mechanism for avoiding disclosure. See Nich-
olas Confessore, PAC Linked to Romney Gets a Mystery Gift,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2011, at A13.
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because of the tax-exempt status granted by Con-
gress, generally do not have taxable income.8
In order to understand the campaign-related tax
regulatory rules, it is important to understand the
current rules that apply to various categories of
tax-exempt organizations. This section briefly sum-
marizes the different types of tax-exempt organiza-
tions and the use of these organizations in political
campaigns.9
A. 501(c)(3) organizations
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are what most
Americans think of when they think of tax-exempt
organizations. These are charitable, religious, and
educational type organizations. Because these orga-
nizations have a charitable purpose, Congress
has provided not only that the income of these orga-
nizations is exempt from tax,10 but also that contri-
butions to the organizations may be deducted by the
donor.11 Thus, section 501(c)(3) organizations
receive a dual tax benefit, and these benefits gener-
ally are considered a subsidy provided by society to
these groups.12
Congress has also determined that organizations
that wish to receive this preferred status should
not participate directly or indirectly in political
campaigns on behalf of a candidate.13 Section
501(c)(3) organizations often attempt to influence
national policy, and thus elections, but the advocacy
must be issue based, not candidate based.14 Thus,
section 501(c)(3) provides a context for understand-
ing some of the structural regulation in the tax-
exempt area. If an organization engages in political
activity, the organization itself may be tax exempt,
but unlike section 501(c)(3) organizations, contribu-
tions to organizations that engage in political activ-
ity are generally not deductible by the payor as
charitable contributions.15
The definition of political intervention under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) also guides the determination
whether something is political intervention under
another section of the Code. Thus if an activity is
political intervention for purposes of section
501(c)(3), it is also political intervention in deter-
mining whether it is an exempt function for political
organizations.16 This is important because it is the
Service’s regulations and interpretations about
political intervention under sections 501(c)(3) and
527 that control here, not the Federal Election Com-
mission’s.
B. 501(c)(4) organizations
Section 501(c)(4) organizations are social wel-
fare organizations. Section 501(c)(4) defines social
welfare organizations as:
8An organization that engages in business activities that are
unrelated to the entity’s exempt purpose must pay tax on that
unrelated business activities. See I.R.C. xx 512, 513.
9This is a brief summary of a more detailed analysis of tax-ex-
empt organizations that appeared in First Amendment Law
Review. For more thorough discussions, see Donald B. Tobin,
Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 37Ga. L. Rev. 611, 638 (2003); Donald B. Tobin, Polit-
ical Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 Geo. L.J. 1313,
1330, 1342–47 (2007); Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy
and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next ‘‘Loophole’’?, 6
First Amend. L. Rev. 41 (2007); Daniel Simmons, An
Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance
Reform, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2002); and Ellen Aprill, Regulating
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
after Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363 (2011).
10Income unrelated to an organization’s exempt purpose is sub-
ject to tax. I.R.C. xx 512, 513.
11I.R.C. x 170; Charitable contributions are generally defined
by x 170(c) of the Code as, among other things, a donation to
a ‘‘corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes.or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals.’’ I.R.C. x 170(c)(2)(B).
This definition closely parallels the definition for an exempt
organization under x 501(c)(3) of the Code. Donations to x
501(c)(3) organizations are deductible by operation of x 170
of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. x 170(c)(2)(D).
12See, e.g., Molly F. Sherlock and Jane G. Gravelle,
Cong. Research Serv., R40919, An Overview of the
Nonprofit and Charitable Sector 41–43 (2009).
13Treas. Reg. x 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (an
organization is an action organization and does not qualify for x
501(c)(3) status if it ‘‘participates or intervenes, directly or indi-
rectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office’’).
14They may lobby, but lobbying may not be a substantial part of
their activities. See x 501(c)(3). No substantial part of a x
501(c)(3) organization’s activity may be for ‘‘carrying on pro-
paganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. and
which does not participate in.any political campaign on behalf
of any candidate for public office.’’ I.R.C. x 501(c)(3)(2002).
See also Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)(ii)(an organization is an action
organization and does not qualify for x 501(c)(3) status if a
‘‘substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence leg-
islation by propaganda or otherwise’’).
15See I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-17 (setting out various scenar-
ios indicating impermissible political intervention); Rev. Rul.
78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (non-biased voting records allowed);
Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73-74 (forum for educating voters
that does not promote one candidate over another is allowed).
16See Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Challenges to ‘‘Facts and Circum-
stances’’—a Standard Whose Time has Passed?, 20 Tax. of
Exempts 5, at n.7–9 (Mar./Apr. 2010) (citing Rev. Rul. 81-95,
Rev. Rul. 2004-6, and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9652026 (Dec. 27,
1996)).
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Civic leagues or organizations not organized
for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare, or local associ-
ations of employees, the membership of
which is limited to the employees of a desig-
nated person or persons.and the net earn-
ings of which are devoted exclusively to
charitable, educational, or recreational pur-
poses.
Although section 501(c)(4) provides that an orga-
nization must be organized ‘‘exclusively for promo-
tion of social welfare,’’ the Treasury regulations
provide for more flexibility than those relevant to
501(c)(3) organizations. Specifically, Treasury reg-
ulations allow (c)(4) organizations to intervene in
political campaigns as long as the organization’s
primary purpose is social welfare.17 Although the
regulations do not define ‘‘primary,’’ it is certainly
less than the statutory term ‘‘exclusively.’’ More-
over, engaging in a political campaign is not con-
sidered a social welfare function.18 Thus, under
current rules, a section 501(c)(4) organization may
intervene in political campaigns, but that activity
may not be its primary purpose. It is important to
emphasize that whether tax-exempt organization’s
activity is considered intervention in a political
campaign is determined by the tax law jurispru-
dence not election law jurisprudence.19
Section 501(c)(4) organizations generally do not
have to pay tax on their income, but they do not
receive the additional subsidy received by section
501(c)(3)s that flows from the deductibility of con-
tributions from the payor.20 Although there were
efforts in Congress to require disclosure for section
501(c)(4) organizations when disclosure provisions
were added to section 527, the final version only
required disclosure for section 527 political organi-
zations.21
Although section 501(c)(4) organizations have
no requirement to publically disclose dona-
tions, they are required to file an annual infor-
mation return, Form 990, with the Internal
Revenue Service.22 The Form 990 provides sig-
nificant information regarding the organization’s
activities, including the names and addresses of
donors who contribute over $5,000.23 Organiza-
tions and the IRS are required to provide 990s to
the public but organizations may and the IRS
must redact information regarding donors to the
organization.
C. 501(c)(5) and (c)(6) organizations
(labor unions and business leagues)
Labor unions and business leagues are tax
exempt and regulated in amanner very similar to sec-
tion 501(c)(4) organizations. Section 501(c)(5) orga-
nizations are ‘‘labor, agricultural, or horticultural
17Similar requirements apply to (c)(5) and (c)(6) organizations.
They must be primarily engaged in labor or business league
activities. Gen. Couns. Mem 34, 233 (Dec. 3, 1969) (political
intervention cannot be the primary activity of a 501(c)(5) or
501(c)(6) organization); John Francis Reilly and Barbara A.
Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of
IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, Exempt
Organizations: Technical Instruction Program for
FY 2003, at L-2 (2002) (same), available at http://www.irs
.gov/ pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.
18I.R.C. x 501(c)(4); Treasury Regulation x 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(2)(i) provides that an organization qualifies as a section
501(c)(4) organization if ‘‘it is primarily engaged in promoting
in some way the common good and general welfare of the peo-
ple of the community.’’ Treasury Regulation x 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) provides that ‘‘the promotion
of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participa-
tion or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office.’’ See also, Rev.
Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (x 501(c)(4) organization may par-
ticipate in a political campaign as long as its primary function
(its other activities) are social welfare functions).
19The regulations do not define ‘‘primary purpose.’’ Democracy
21 and the Campaign Legal Center have recently filed a ‘‘Peti-
tion for Rulemaking’’ arguing that the Service should use an
‘‘insubstantial amount’’ test instead of a ‘‘primary purpose’’
test. Many practitioners argue that ‘‘primary purpose’’ is less
than 50 percent. As discussed later in this article, the 50 percent
standard makes sense when one examines the entire regulatory
regime for tax-exempt organizations. See ‘‘Petition for Rule-
making,’’ available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/
attachments/IRS_PETITION.FINAL.7-27-2011.pdf.
20They are subject to tax on investment income to the extent of
the amount they spend on political activity. See I.R.C. x 527(f).
21The original versions of the bills introduced in the House and
Senate only dealt with the regulation of 527 political organiza-
tions. There were efforts in the Republican controlled House to
broaden the disclosure requirements to include all tax-exempt
organizations, and the bill reported by the House Ways and
Means Committee included broad disclosure requirements.
See H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 9–11. It set a very low level for dis-
closure of contributions and expenditures and did not require
disclosure by corporations. There were serious concerns from
the tax-exempt community that the provisions in the Committee
bill were too broad. The Democrats offered a substitute that
would have required disclosure by all organizations (taxable
and non-taxable) that spent more than $10,000 on electioneer-
ing activities and required disclosure of donations over
$1,000. H. Rep. No. 106-702, at 40–41. The House ultimately
suspended its rules and took up the original pre-committee ver-
sion of the bill, which provided for disclosure only of contribu-
tions and expenditures of x 527 political organizations. The
Senate passed the House version of the bill.
22I.R.C. x 6033(a); Treas. Reg. x 1.6033-2.
23Treas. Reg. x 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(f).
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organizations,’’ and section 501(c)(6)s are generally
business leagues or chambers of commerce. These
organizations are also tax-exempt with regard
to the organizations’ income. Just as section
501(c)(4)s, donations to these organizations are
not deductible by the payor as charitable contribu-
tions, and the organizations may intervene in polit-
ical campaigns as long as it is not the organization’s
primary purpose.24 In addition, like section
501(c)(4)s, the Code does not require, except in
very limited circumstances, section 501(c)(5) and
section 501(c)(6) organizations to disclose publicly
the identities of their contributors or, for the most
part, of the recipients of their expenditures.25 In
addition, if campaign intervention became the pri-
mary purpose of the above organizations, the disclo-
sure provisions in section 527 would apply to the
organization.26
D. Section 527 organizations
Prior to the passage of section 527, many politi-
cal organizations did not qualify as tax-exempt
under any of the above sections because their pri-
mary activity involved intervention in a political
campaign. No other type of tax-exempt organization
is allowed to have intervention in a political cam-
paign as its primary purpose. Congress’s solution
was to create a tax-exempt category under sec-
tion 527 for organizations whose primary purpose
was to influence elections.27 Just like section
501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations, a section
527 organization is generally exempt from tax on its
income, and donations to section 527 organizations
are not deductible by the donor. A section 527 orga-
nization is an organization ‘‘operated primarily for
the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting con-
tributions or making expenditures’’ to influence
the ‘‘selection, nomination, election, or appointment
of any individual to any Federal, State or local pub-
lic office.’’28 Unlike section 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and
(c)(6) organizations, contributions to section 527
organizations are also statutorily exempt from the
gift tax.29
Prior to 2001, the major tax regulatory difference
between the various tax-exempt organizations
(other than section 501(c)(3) organizations) was
the purpose of the organization.30 There was very
little advantage to using one entity over another so
entity planning or entity manipulation based on
tax considerations was almost non-existent.31 Con-
gress shifted this balance when it added disclosure
provisions to section 527. Under the disclosure pro-
visions in section 527, most section 527 organiza-
tions are now required to disclose the sources of
contributions in excess of $200 and the recipients
of expenditures in excess of $500 on periodically
filed reports that are publicly available through a
website maintained by the IRS.32 These provisions
were not added to sections of the Code regulating
other tax-exempt organizations, so organizations
that do not want to disclose this information now
have an incentive to try to qualify as another type
of tax-exempt organization.
Lastly, one important facet of the regulatory
scheme is that section 527 appears to have been
written in a way that makes inclusion into its
regulatory regime mandatory.33 Congress would
naturally have been concerned that organizations
would avoid the disclosure provisions either by
not filing as a section 527 organization or by choos-
ing a different tax-exempt form even though those
organizations were the type of organization the sec-
tion was trying to regulate. An organization is sub-
ject to section 527 even if it does not apply for
section 527 status. Under section 527(i) an organi-
zation must give notice to the Secretary that it
24Donations to section 501(c)(5) and section 501(c)(6) organi-
zations may be deductible as business expenses, but the deduc-
tion is effectively denied to the extent such donations are used
for political intervention or lobbying. See Reilly and Allen,
supra note 17, at L-19 to L-20 (describing this effective denial
of deductibility).
25I.R.C. x 501(c)(5), (6), Gen. Couns. Mem 34, 233 (Dec. 3,
1969) (political intervention cannot be the primary activity of
a 501(c)(6) organization).
26See infra Part I.D (describing provision in x 527).
27I.R.C. x 527(e)(1) (2002).
2826 C.F.R. x1.527-2(a).
29I.R.C. x 2501(a)(5) (2002).
30Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (codified at 26
U.S.C. x 527 (2001)).
31This is not true with regard to the use of (c)(3)s. Because con-
tributions to 501(c)(3)s are deductible by the donor, there is sig-
nificant planning with regard to whether an organization could
organize as a (c)(3) or whether the organization should create a
(c)(3) with a connected (c)(4) or 527.
32I.R.C. x 527(j)(1), (j)(3)(A), (j)(3)(B) (2002).
33See Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States,
148 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Nat’l Fed’n of
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1300, 1308 n.7. (S.D. Ala. 2002); Field Serv. Adv.
200037040 (indicating that x 527 is not an elective provision);
Rev. Rul. 2003-49 (Answer 20: indicating that an organization
is subject to 527 if it meets the definition of political organiza-
tion in x 527(e)).
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wishes to be treated as a section 527 organization. A
section 527 organization that does not give notice is
subject to tax under section 527(i)(4). Thus, accord-
ing to the IRS, an organization is a political organi-
zation if it meets the definition in section 527(e)
even if the organization does not notify the Secre-
tary under section 527(i).34 It is simply a political
organization that has failed to make disclosures
under section 527(i). Thus organizations seeking
to avoid section 527’s regulatory regime by forgo-
ing tax-exempt status may find themselves forced
into 527, resulting in all their contributions and
expenditures being subject to tax.35
II. QUICK REGULATORY MEASURES
TO PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY
WITH REGARD TO TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
The current campaign finance disclosure regime is
failing to achieve its goal of requiring disclosure for
campaign related spending. In many cases, individu-
als and organizations are either forming or using tax-
exempt organizations (sections 501 (c)(4), (c)(5), and
(c)(6) organizations) as a conduit for undisclosed
campaign intervention. This regime was not intended
by Congress, and the incoherence in our campaign
finance disclosure rules will negatively impact both
the anti-corruption and voter information interests
that are important for a sound election system.
Although an ideal system would integrate election
law disclosure provisions and tax law disclosure pro-
visions, something less ideal can be done relatively
quickly to close current loopholes used by many
groups engaged in independent expenditures.36 The
Treasury has the power to require further disclosure
of tax-exempt organizations through regulations,
and the Treasury should seek to do so both to stem
the abuse of tax-exempt status by independent orga-
nizations and to provide further coherence to the law
of tax-exempt organizations.
A. Current problem with campaign
finance disclosure provisions
In 2001, Congress sought a mechanism to provide
for disclosure of campaign related independent expen-
ditures.37 Under existing law, campaign spending that
was funneled through PACs was subject to a fairly
extensive disclosure regime.38 Non-PACs, however,
were able to spend large sums of money influencing
elections without disclosing those contributions. Enti-
ties achieved this end by claiming that the organiza-
tions were not PACs because they did not engage in
express advocacy as defined by the Court in Buck-
ley.39 Because these organizations argued they were
not PACs, they claimed they were not subject to any
of the disclosure provisions in FECA. In many
cases, these organizations engaged in advertisements
that were clearly ads aimed at promoting or attacking
a particular candidate. The ads avoided using the
‘‘magic words’’ in Buckley, like ‘‘vote for’’ or ‘‘vote
against,’’ but were clearly not merely discussing
issues.40 By avoiding express advocacy, IGs were
able to engage in unlimited advocacy, and the organi-
zations were not required to disclose contributions or
expenditures.
Congress took two approaches to close what it
saw as a subversion of the disclosure provisions in
FECA. First, as discussed earlier, since most
of these groups were organized as political organi-
zations under section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, Congress added disclosure provisions to
34Field Serv. Adv. 200037040.
35In addition to the public disclosure requirements in the stat-
ute, x 527 organizations must also file a yearly information
return, Form 990, with the Service. I.R.C. x 6033(g).
36Although the Court in Buckley indicated that independent
expenditures were not corrupting because they were indepen-
dent of candidates, recent history of political operatives form-
ing independent groups, and the almost party-like activity of
these groups, seriously call that assumption into question.
Large independent contributions where the donor, recipient,
and candidate know of the donation, but are secret from every-
one else, pose the most serious risk for corruption.
37For a more thorough discussion of the disclosure provisions in
BCRA, see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax
Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities
Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Dis-
closure Laws,Nexus Chapman’s Journal of Law and Pub-
lic Policy (May 6, 2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract = 1833484.
3811 C.F.R. x 104.3(b)(3)(vii)(A); x 104.4(a)–(c).
39The Supreme Court in Buckley limited several provisions in
the Federal Election Campaign Act to communication that
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976). Although the jurispru-
dence is not completely settled on this issue, courts have
generally required certain ‘‘magic words’’ for communication
to be considered express advocacy. Those words were set out
in footnote 52 in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 44. (magic words include
‘‘vote for,’’ ‘‘elect,’’ ‘‘support’’); see, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The
‘‘Major Purpose’’ Test Distinguishing Between Election-
Focused and Issue-Focused Groups, 31 N. Ky. L. Rev. 341
(2004); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for
Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham
Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265 (2000).
40Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 44, n.52 (1976).
432 TOBIN
section 527. These provisions required section 527
organizations to either disclose contributions and
expenditures, or pay a tax at the highest corporate
rate (now 35%) on any non-disclosed contribution
or expenditure.41 This disclosure provision only
applied to 527 political organizations.42
Second, soon after adding disclosure provisions
to section 527 of the Code, as part of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001 (BCRA), Congress
provided for the disclosure of contributions and
expenditures for ‘‘electioneering communication.’’43
Electioneering communication is defined as broad-
cast communication that refers to a ‘‘clearly identi-
fied candidate for Federal office’’ and is within 60
days of a general election or within 30 days of a pri-
mary.44 Congress therefore targeted for disclosure
both a type of organization (527) and a type of activ-
ity (electioneering communications).
The FEC, however, issued regulations in interpret-
ing BCRA that significantly weaken the BCRA dis-
closure provisions. The regulations also enable
donors to use section 501(c)(4) social welfare organi-
zations (and labor unions and business leagues) as a
means of avoiding disclosure. The FEC regulations
provide that an organization must disclose donations
if the donation is made for the purpose of electioneer-
ing communication, but if the funds are not desig-
nated for electioneering communication they need
not be disclosed (even if they are used for such
activity).45 Organizations wishing to keep donors’
names confidential can achieve that end merely by
having the donors make contributions to a section
501(c)(4) (or other, non-527, non-PAC) organization
without designating the contribution for a particular
advertisement or communication.
Political operatives have therefore designed the
following type of plan for engaging in undisclosed
political advocacy: Six months before an election
a major political operative highly connected with
a political party or candidate creates a section
501(c)(4) organization. Upon creation, the organiza-
tion files its articles of incorporation as a corporation
with a state. Although there is an application for
exemption (Form 1024) that the organization can
file with the Service to seek recognition of section
501(c)(4) status, the organization is not required to
do so. The entity is required to file an annual informa-
tion return (Form 990), but that form is not required to
be filed until the fifteenth day of the fifth month fol-
lowing the end of the taxable year.46 In addition, an
entity can request a six-month extension, which the
IRS routinely grants. So after forming the organiza-
tion, the entity does not need to file anything with
the Service for 22.5 months from the date of forma-
tion if it chooses to have its fiscal year begin at the
time of its formation and requests the routine six-
month extension for filing.47 The organization claims
to be a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization
and starts engaging in political activity. The organi-
zation might actually be more properly classified as
a section 527 political organization, but there is no
check on the organization until it files its Form
1024 (not required) or its Form 990 (in 22.5 months).
The organization’s claim that it will engage in social
welfare activities thus qualifies it for section
501(c)(4) status, and there is no immediate validation
of this claim by the IRS. Furthermore, the organiza-
tion does not comply with the disclosure provisions
under section 527 because it claims that intervening
in an election is not its primary purpose.
The organization then receives money from large
political donors that are not earmarked for specific
activities. Because these donations are to the section
501(c)(4) for ‘‘general’’ activities of the organiza-
tion, the donations are considered donations to the
organization and not for electioneering communica-
tions, so they do not need to be disclosed under the
FEC’s interpretation. Given the (claimed) section
501(c)(4) status, there are no provisions in the
Code to require public disclosure of the donations.48
41I.R.C. x 527.
42As noted earlier, efforts to extend the disclosure provisions to
other tax-exempt organizations were not successful. See DIS-
CLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Congress (2010); S. 3628,
111th Congress (2010).
43Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 2356, 107th
Cong., Title II, x 201 Cong. (2002). See 2 U.S.C. x 434(f) (pro-
viding for disclosure if electioneering communication exceeds
$10,000. Must disclose contributions of $1,000 and expendi-
tures over $10,000); see supra note 17.
442 U.S.C. x 434(f)(3).
45Electioneering Communication, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899, 72911
(Dec. 26, 2007) (codified at 11 CFR Part 104, 114).
46I.R.C. x 6033.
47Treas. Reg. x 6033-1(e).
48Moreover, if an entity or person wants to give to an indepen-
dent x 527 political organization, but does not want the contri-
bution disclosed, the party can donate the money to a x
501(c)(4) organization and the x 501(c)(4) organization can
donate the money to the x 527 organization, or to several x
527 organizations. The only report disclosed by the x 527 orga-
nization would be the donation by a x 501(c)(4) organization.
Thus, the company can use a x 501(c)(4) organization as a
conduit to avoid disclosure of contributions made to a x 527
organization.
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Once it receives an influx of money from large
donors, the organization starts spending heavily in
an election. It avoids engaging in ‘‘express advoca-
cy’’ as defined by Buckley v. Valeo and thus avoids
PAC status. Instead, it engages in electioneering
communication and therefore has to disclose the
expenditures. In this case, the organization discloses
that it engaged in various electioneering communi-
cation, but as long as its donors avoid designating
their contributions for such activities no disclosure
of donor identities is required under current FEC
rules.
At the end of the election, if it wishes, the orga-
nization can close up shop. It still needs to file a
Form 990, but it has already succeeded in its goal.
It has spent heavily on election activity and may
have influenced an election, while being able to
keep its donors secret. If it plans on complying
with the law, the organization must still engage in
a significant amount of social welfare activity to
qualify as a social welfare organization. Further-
more, since these organizations do not have to file
anything publically or with the Service for 22.5
months, there is no real check on whether these
organizations are complying with the law until
well after at least the first election in which the
organization is involved.
Although there was a significant increase in elec-
tion activity by 501(c)(4)s in the 2008 election, the
increase in available contribution sources post-Citi-
zens United caused even more interest in using
501(c)(4) organizations as independent political
campaign entities.49 While significant information
regarding the operation of these entities is not yet
available, published reports indicate that at least
some of the entities claiming section 501(c)(4) sta-
tus are probably not complying with the law.
Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies (Cross-
roads GPS) is the 2010 classic example of an orga-
nization that claims to be a section 501(c)(4)
organization but appears to operate far more like a
section 527 political organization. Although nomi-
nally a 501(c)(4) organization, Crossroads spent
millions of dollars in the 2010 election.50 In a
2010 New York Times article, Steven Law, President
of Crossroads GPS, indicated that the organization
was not a political committee because it was pro-
moting ‘‘a suite of issues that are likely to see
some sort of legislative response.’’51 Mr. Law may
be correct that Crossroads GPS is not a political
committee as defined by the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act or other election law rules. The orga-
nization could still be a section 527 political
organization as defined by the Internal Revenue
Code, however, and thus subject to the disclosure
provisions in section 527.
Mr. Law’s comment that Crossroads GPS is pro-
moting a ‘‘suite of issues’’ that are likely to have a
‘‘legislative response’’ is likely hinting at the idea
that the organization’s activities are lobbying, and
that lobbying is a social welfare purpose. Thus if
Crossroads GPS primarily engaged in lobbying on
issues, Crossroads GPS would qualify for section
501(c)(4) status. The actual activities by Crossroads
GPS, however, appear far more candidate specific
than lobbying. In addition, it is the tax law on polit-
ical intervention that governs here, not the interpre-
tations of election law by the Federal Election
Commission. Since tax jurisprudence applies a
facts and circumstances approach, Crossroads can-
not satisfy its social welfare purpose under section
501(c)(4) by engaging in electioneering masked as
lobbying. Under certain FEC rules, an advertise-
ment can lambast a candidate and state at the end
of the advertisement ‘‘call Senator Smith and tell
him to vote for lower taxes’’ to avoid the reach of
federal election laws because this may be consid-
ered grass roots lobbying and not express advocacy,
and so not subject to the election law reporting and
disclosure requirements. In the tax context, how-
ever, this type of communication will almost always
be considered intervention in a political campaign.
More specifically, in Revenue Ruling 2007-41,
the Treasury provided guidance with regard to
what constitutes political intervention and set out
examples of political campaigning by tax-exempt
entities. The ruling specifically notes that activities
short of express advocacy will be considered
49Campaign Finance Institute, Soft Money Political spending by
501(c) Nonprofits Tripled in 2008 Election (2009), Campaign
Finance Institute, 501(c) Groups Emerge as Big Players Along-
side 527s (2008).
50It is impossible to determine exactly how much Crossroads
spent because some of its spending was not disclosed. The Cen-
ter for Responsive Politics collects data on disclosed political
contributions and expenditures. It reports that Crossroads
GPS spent over $17 million on campaign activity that it dis-
closed to the FEC. Center for Responsive Politics, Opensecrets
.org, report on Crossroads GPS, available at <http://www
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=Crossroads+
Grassroots+Policy+Strategies> .
51Michael Luo and Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain
Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2010.
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campaign intervention and that the Service will look
at all the facts and circumstances in reaching its
determination.52 Factors include whether a candidate
is mentioned, the statement expresses approval or
disapproval of a candidate, the statement is near an
election, the issue in the communication is one that
is an issue in the campaign and distinguishes candi-
dates, the communication is part of ongoing commu-
nication by the organization that is made independent
of an election, and whether the timing is related to a
non-electoral event.53 The Service takes a fairly strict
view of what constitutes campaign intervention when
considering these factors. For example, Revenue
Ruling 2007-14 explains that discussing an issue
that separates candidates near in time to an election
and urging people to use their power at the polls is
campaign intervention.54
In a report in the Huffington Post, Crossroads
spokesman, Jonathan Collegio, explains that Cross-
roads is comfortably within the law.55 But in his
response to the reporter who wrote the report, Col-
legio appears to be applying election law and not
the tax law surrounding section 501(c)(4) status.
For example, Collegio is reported as having
explained ‘‘GPS invested millions of dollars in
social welfare issue advocacy advertising before
the FEC’s 60 day reporting window last summer.’’56
He appears to be arguing that since the advertise-
ments were not ‘‘electioneering communication,’’
they were not election advocacy. The key question
under the tax law, however, is whether the advocacy
outside the reporting window was actually issue
advocacy, or whether under the facts and circum-
stances test it would constitute intervention in a
political campaign. Since one component of the
facts and circumstances test is the timing of the
activity, the fact that the advertisement ran at a cer-
tain time is relevant, but it is not determinative. In
this case, full consideration of the timing prong
actually hurts Crossroads, because Crossroads
was formed soon before the election and its com-
munications were closely tied to the election.57
For example, on August 25, 2010, a little over 60
days before the 2010 election, Crossroads GPS
announced that it was going to spend over $2 mil-
lion on ‘‘three new issue advertisements. in Penn-
sylvania, California, and Kentucky.58 Whether these
are ‘‘issue advertisements’’ for purposes of election
law is unclear, but they are clearly political inter-
vention under the facts and circumstances test.
One advertisement provided:
We’re hurting but what are they doing in
Washington? Congressman Joe Sestak voted
for Obama’s big government health care
scheme. Billions in job-killing taxes and
higher insurance premiums for hard hit fami-
lies. Even worse Sestak voted to gut Medicare,
a $500 billion dollar cut, [and] reduce benefits
for 850,000 Pennsylvania seniors. Higher
taxes and premiums, fewer jobs, Medicare
cuts—the Sestak/Obama plan costs us too
much. Tell Congressman Sestak [to] stop the
Medicare cuts.59
This advertisement is not electioneering com-
munication, and thus is not subject to disclosure
under the electioneering communication provisions
because the advertisement was just outside the elec-
tioneering communication 60-day window. Cross-
roads GPS may also be able to avoid disclosure
under FECA by claiming that this is not express
advocacy under election law standards because it
avoids ‘‘magic words.’’ It cannot, however, claim
that this is issue advocacy for purposes of justifying
a social welfare purpose under section 501(c)(4).
Applying the facts and circumstances test leaves
no doubt that these advertisements are political
intervention. The ad mentions a candidate. The
statement expresses clear disapproval of the candi-
date. The statement is near in time to an election
and the issue in the communication is one that is
an issue in the campaign and distinguishes candi-
dates. The communication is not part of ongoing
52See Revenue Rule 2007-41 (‘‘Issue Advocacy and Political
Campaign Intervention,’’ Exs. 14–16).
53Id.
54Id. (Fact Sheet ex. 16).
55Dan Froomkin, IRS to Take on Karl Rove? Tax Laws Could
Take a Bite out of Secret Political Spending, Huffington




57See Can’t Afford Patty (Oct. 4, 2010)(commercial by
Crossroads GPS attacking Senator Patty Murray), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= nBJTiXvM3_4; Hurting for
Certain (commercial by Crossroad GPS attacking Congressman
Sestack), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCB
Ibj9nOMs.
58Crossroads GPS, Press Release, Crossroads GPS Launches
New Issue Ads In Pennsylvania, California and Kentucky,
Aug. 25, 2010.
59Crossroads GPS provides a link to the advertisement on its
Web site. See http://crossroadsgps.org/news/crossroads-gps-
launches-new-issue-ads-pennsylvania-california-and-kentucky.
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communication that is independent of the election
and the timing is not related to a non-electoral
event. The fact that the end of the ad tells Congress-
man Sestak to stop Medicare cuts does not outweigh
these other facts, given that the Obama plan had
already passed and the votes had already occurred
on the alleged cuts. Looking at all of the relevant
facts and circumstances, this ad was not an ad lob-
bying for an issue, but was instead an attack on Con-
gressman Sestak as a candidate for re-election.
Moreover, Collegio explained that American
Crossroads GPS raised approximately 43 million
dollars in 2010.60 Since Crossroads spent a signifi-
cant amount on electioneering communications,
much of which will likely be deemed political inter-
vention by the IRS as well, Crossroads has very lit-
tle basis for claiming its primary purpose is social
welfare. Because of the act of disclosure of its activ-
ities, it is impossible to tell the magnitude of Cross-
roads GPS’s activities and how much it spent on
social welfare activities versus political campaign
activities at this time, but what is clear is that Cross-
roads GPS cannot import the election law definition
into the tax code. Based on the facts and circum-
stances test, many of Crossroads GPS’s so-called
issue advocacy advertisements should be deemed
intervention in a political campaign. This strongly
suggests that it should not qualify as a section
501(c)(4) organization.61 While not all of Cross-
roads GPS’s activities would be considered inter-
vention in a political campaign, social welfare
activities appear to have been a relatively small
proportion of Crossroads GPS’s efforts. For exam-
ple, in 2011, Crossroads GPS ran a series of
advertisements criticizing unions that support gov-
ernment workers. Although these advertisements
mention Obama, they are far from an election
and are not candidate specific. These types of
advertisements would likely not be considered
political intervention.62
Where Crossroads GPS went, it appears that oth-
ers will soon follow. According to recent reports,
Democratic-leaning organizations are forming sec-
tion 501(c)(4) tax-exempt organizations to operate
in a similar fashion to Crossroads GPS.63 It is too
early to document their activities, but at least one
report indicates that these left-leaning organizations
are already attracting significant funds.64 If there is
no action soon, nominal section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions may become the primary vehicle for indepen-
dent campaign activity, and large undisclosed
contributions and expenditures may become the
norm. Crossroads and other organizations may be
willing to take an aggressive position with regard
to their tax-exempt status because they know the
Service does not want to get involved in these
types of political issues. The Service is principally
interested in fairly collecting revenue. It is very sen-
sitive to claims that it is acting in a political manner,
and the impression of a politicized Internal Revenue
Service hurts its overall mission. The moment the
Service examines Crossroads or any other politi-
cally active 501(c)(4) organization, there will be
assertions of political manipulation. Crossroads
and others know that such assertions will cloud
the Service’s intentions and dampen the sting of
any enforcement action. It also means that the Serv-
ice will pay a high price for enforcing the political
intervention provision.
60Id.
61There are many complaints regarding the facts and circum-
stances test and practitioners have sought more certainty from
the Service with regard to the test. Some have also argued
that the facts and circumstances test violates the First Amend-
ment. Although a thorough examination of the constitutionality
of the test is outside the scope of this article, most of the com-
plaints regarding the test have involved the application of the
test to x 501(c)(3) organizations because the test has the impact
of prohibiting the organization from engaging in the questioned
speech. Thus some argue that the test is vague and its applica-
tion to 501(c)(3) organizations restrains organizations from
engaging in permissible speech. While I believe the test is con-
stitutional in the 501(c)(3) context, it is certainly constitutional
in the 501(c)(4) context where it is solely used as a sorting
device. It helps determine whether an organization is a social
welfare organization or a political organization. It has no
impact on whether the organization can engage in the activity
and therefore does not restrict speech. See Elizabeth J. Kings-
ley, Challenges to ‘‘Facts and Circumstances’’—a Standard
Whose Time has Passed?, 20 Tax. of Exempts 5, at n.7–9
(Mar./Apr. 2010) (arguing that the facts and circumstances
standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 501(c)(3)
organizations and highly problematic with regard to 501(c)(4)
organizations).
62Although the advertisements mention President Obama, the
Presidential Campaign is not near in time and the commercial
is far more of an anti-union advertisement than an attempt to
intervene in an election campaign. An example of its anti-
union advertisement can be found at http://crossroadsgps
.org/news/crossroads-gps-launches-new-nationwide-issue-ad-
government-employee-unions.
63Froomkin, supra note 55 (‘‘If people look at what Crossroads
did over the course of the last couple of years, that’ll give them
a good sense of our activity,’’ quoting Bill Burton, former aide
to President Barack Obama co-founder Priorities USA).
64Kenneth P. Vogel, Both Sides Now in Dash for Anonymous
Cash, Politico, Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www
.politico.com/news/stories/0811/60731.html.
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In fact, in May 2011, when it was reported that
the Service was examining some taxpayers’ returns
for failure to pay gift tax on contributions to
501(c)(4) organizations, Republican Senators sent
a letter to the Service investigating whether the
action was political.65 The letter appears to have
been effective in that over the summer the Service
announced it was dropping those audits.66 Similarly
when the Service audited the NAACP after com-
ments by its President, the NAACP claimed that
the audit was due to criticism of President Bush
and, in response, Senator Baucus, Chair of the
Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to the Com-
missioner of the Internal Revenue expressing his
concern about the audit.67 Political operatives
know that the Service is ill suited to take enforce-
ment action in the political arena, and that in any
event, any action will be post-election, after the
activities have already occurred.
B. The current statutory framework
and the role for regulation
The current regulatory structure that applies to
tax-exempt organizations creates incentives for
organizations to push the envelope regarding their
proper organizational form. The Treasury has the
authority to create coherence in the current statutory
structure and should do so by, among other things,
requiring greater disclosure by non-501(c)(3) tax-
exempt organizations.
Under the pre-2001 version of the Code, entities
chose the proper tax-exempt classification based on
the activities of the organization. For the most part,
all tax-exempt organizations, with the exception of
501(c)(3) organizations, received the same benefits.
The organizations were not subject to tax on their
income, including donations, but donations to the
organizations were not tax deductible as charitable
contributions. Section 527 was the home for entities
that had a primary purpose of intervening in cam-
paigns, section 501(c)(4) was for social welfare
organizations, section 501(c)(5) was for labor
unions, and section 501(c)(6) was for business
leagues. The question was a basketing one—what
was the proper home for the organization, given
what it was trying to accomplish?
Under a literal reading of the statute, however,
there was no home for an organization that wished
to engage in some campaign intervention, but for
which campaign intervention was not the primary
purpose. (If campaign intervention was its primary
purpose it could be a section 527 political organiza-
tion.) Under section 501(c)(4), social welfare orga-
nizations must be ‘‘operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare’’ (emphasis added).
Political intervention has not generally been thought
of as a social welfare purpose, and the regulations to
section 501(c)(4) provide that campaign activities
are not social welfare activities. This interpretation
made sense because if campaign activities were
social welfare activities there would be no need
for section 527, which governed political organiza-
tions. But this created a problem of classification for
organizations that were primarily engaged in social
welfare activities, but also engaged in some cam-
paign activities. Such an organization would not
be ‘‘exclusively’’ engaged in social welfare activi-
ties, under the ordinary meaning of ‘‘exclusively.’’
Accordingly, there would be a gap in the statu-
tory structure, with section 501(c)(4) providing
entity status to social welfare organizations and sec-
tion 527 providing entity status to political organi-
zations. An organization that had a mix between
social welfare and political activity could organize
as a 527 political organization if that was the orga-
nization’s primary purpose, but there was no entity
status for an organization that primarily engaged
in social welfare but also engaged in some political
65Press Release, United States Committee on Finance, Senators
to IRS: Questions Raised by Agency’s Recent Actions Into Gift
Tax Enforcement; Concern about Political Influence (May 18,
2011) (asking for names of individuals who made the decision
to enforce the provision, correspondence between IRS employ-
ees, Treasury, and White House on the issue, and any analysis
generated by the IRS regarding First Amendment issues related
to the collection. The Senate requested the information in 9
business days.), available at http://finance.senate.gov/news-
room/ranking/release/?id = ec29441e-aefd-4192-a628-d96966
cf4231.
66See Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commis-
sioner for Services and Enforcement, July 7, 2011, available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/guidance_for_irs_sbse_
estate_and_gift_tax_and_tege_exempt_organizations.pdf.
For criticism of this IRS decision, see Letter from Marcus
Owens to Emily S. McMahon, Aug. 8, 2011, available
at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/McMahonletter.pdf;
Donald B. Tobin, Is Congress Politicizing the Tax Enforcement
Process?, Tax Notes Today, 2011 TNT 162-11, Aug. 22,
2011 (letter to the editor).
67Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Baucus Questions
IRS’s Investigation Regarding the NAACP (Oct. 29, 2004),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/
release/?id = f45c7e73-71b7-46e6-9407-0536b8458a7a.
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activity.68 Under this reading, the statutory scheme
would give tax-exempt status to organizations that
exclusively engaged in political activity, to organiza-
tions that exclusively engaged in social welfare activ-
ities, and to organizations that engaged in a mix of
political and social welfare activity where political
activity was the primary purpose, but would deny
tax-exempt status to social welfare organizations that
engaged in a mix of social welfare and political activ-
ity where political activity was not the primary pur-
pose. The problem with such a scheme is that it
makes no sense. There is no good reason why Con-
gress would want one type of mixed social welfare/po-
litical organization to be tax-exempt but not the other.
Treasury regulations create statutory coherence
by providing more flexibility with regard to the pur-
pose of a social welfare organization. The regula-
tions allow section 501(c)(4) organizations to
intervene in political campaigns, so long as the
organization’s primary purpose is social welfare—
even though the statute states that such an organization
must be operated ‘‘exclusively’’ for social welfare.
Therefore, under the regulations, an organization that
has the primary purpose of engaging in social welfare
may intervene in political campaigns, so long as that
activity is not its primary purpose. This made sense,
because a regulatory structure prohibiting all campaign
activity by 501(c)(4) organizations (which would arise
from a strict textualist reading of the word ‘‘exclusive-
ly’’) would have been inconsistent with other provisions
in the Code related to other tax-exempt organizations—
principally section 527. There is no good reason for
allowing an organization with the primary purpose
of intervening in campaigns to be tax-exempt but
not allowing a social welfare organization, which
would have been tax exempt in the same manner as
a 527 political organization, to lose its exemption if
it engaged in any campaign activity. The statutory
scheme otherwise treated the organizations very sim-
ilarly.69 Until 2001, there was little advantage in
choosing one organizational form over the other.
This all changed when disclosure provisions
were added to section 527, and changed even
more dramatically as corporate money began to
flow into independent political groups after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. Now
there is a significant advantage to being classified
as a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization,
because contributions to section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions are not subject to the extensive disclosure pro-
visions in section 527.
Organizations such as Crossroads GPS are there-
fore trying to claim that even though they engage in
significant campaign related spending, their pri-
mary purpose is social welfare. The idea is that
they will engage in enough social welfare spending
to allow social welfare to be their primary purpose.
At the moment it is impossible to tell whether these
organizations are in fact meeting the primary pur-
pose test, but in light of the magnitude of money
they are spending on campaign intervention, it
will be very difficult for some of them to credibly
claim to be social welfare organizations. This is,
however, a very difficult issue to police, and an easier
way to address the concerns raised by this manipula-
tion is to promulgate regulations requiring greater
political activity disclosure by tax-exempt entities.
C. Justification for regulation
The Treasury has several justifications for seek-
ing to promulgate regulations in this area. First,
the Treasury has limited resources and can properly
determine that it would rather close loopholes that
incentivize entities to improperly organize with
regard to tax-exempt form than attempt to audit
thousands of organizations. Second, existing Treas-
ury regulations expand the class of organizations
that qualify for section 501(c)(4) status. The statute
provides that section 501(c)(4) organizations must
be exclusively engaged in social welfare activities.
It is the Treasury regulation requiring only a pri-
mary purpose of social welfare to be a section
501(c)(4) organization, instead of an exclusive pur-
pose, that has allowed some organizations to subvert
the disclosure requirements in the Code. If the
Treasury regulation expanding the reach of the stat-
ute is being abused, the Treasury has the authority to
68Arguably, if a 527 organization spent more than an insubstan-
tial amount on social welfare activities, the social welfare activ-
ities would not be considered ‘‘exempt function’’ activities and
the amount received for those activities would not be exempt
under x 527 and thus might be subject to tax. See Treas. Reg.
1.527-2(b). Amounts spent on those activities, however, might
still not be subject to tax because it is not clear that the amounts
received to spend on those activities were ‘‘income’’ and thus
subject to tax. While a thorough examination of this issue is
outside the scope of this article, it is clear that x 527 organiza-
tions may engage in both political intervention activities and
social welfare activities as long as the political intervention
activity is the primary purpose of the organization.
69At that time, there was one major tax difference between 527
and 501(c)(4) organizations: Section 527 organizations are stat-
utory exempt from the gift tax, while 501(c)(4) organizations
are not.
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limit that abuse. Moreover, the Treasury has an
interest in ensuring that its regulations do not provide
the basis for organizations to circumvent statutory
requirements. Finally, and most importantly, the
Treasury has an interest in creating a coherent set of
rules governing tax-exempt organizations. The current
rules regulating tax-exempt organizations do not pro-
vide for a coherent structure, and the Treasury has the
authority to step in and create such a structure.
Treasury also has the authority to promulgate
such regulations. Section 7805 of the Code provides
the Secretary of Treasury with the power to pro-
scribe ‘‘all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],
including all rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to
internal revenue.’’ In United States v. Correl,70 the
Court recognized the breadth of the Secretary’s
power under section 7805:
Congress has delegated to the Commissioner,
not to the courts, the task of prescribing ‘‘all
needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment’’ of the Internal Revenue Code. 26
U.S.C. x 7805(a). In this area of limitless factual
variations ‘‘it is the province of Congress and the
Commissioner, not the courts, to make the
appropriate adjustments.’’ Commissioner v.
Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 296. The rule of the judi-
ciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with
assuring that the Commissioner’s regulations
fall within his authority to implement the con-
gressional mandate in some reasonable manner.
Were the Treasury to promulgate new rules for
tax-exempt organizations, it would be acting squarely
within its core function of enforcing the Internal
Revenue Code. The interpretation of the statute
embodied in the current regulations is providing a
loophole with regard to another provision of the
Code. This loophole is both causing enforcement
problems and subverting the will of Congress in
its enactment of another provision of the Code.
The Treasury has the authority to enact regulations
that will limit this abuse, reduce enforcement prob-
lems, and encourage compliance with congressio-
nally enacted disclosure provisions.
Moreover, the Congress, in passing disclosure
provisions in section 527, was providing for a stat-
utory scheme to enhance voter information and
decrease corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion. New regulations will reinforce these goals
and help ensure the proper enforcement of the
rules. The Treasury therefore can and should use
its authority under section 7805 to address the fail-
ures in the current regulatory structure.
III. CREATING A COHERENT
STRUCTURE FOR THE REGULATION
OF TAX- EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
In the tax policy arena, there is a consistent pat-
tern of legislation and then obfuscation. Legislators,
regulators, and lawyers are constantly confronting
new tax shelter schemes that are designed to manip-
ulate and circumvent the statutory structure of the
Code. We are now seeing the same type of pattern
in the campaign finance arena. The problem is
that legislative change cannot keep pace with the
flexibility and manipulation of many who are
involved in trying to win elections. The Treasury
should, consistent with its authority under section
7805, step in with new regulations designed to
cure some of the current defects. While coherent
legislative action would be preferable, Treasury
can more expeditiously implement regulations that
will at least reduce the manipulation of tax-exempt
status as a means of avoiding disclosure.
A. Require application for exemption
Although there is an application that tax-exempt
organizations can fill out in order to seek recogni-
tion of their status as a tax-exempt organization,
section 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations
are not required to submit an application.71 Organ-
izations wishing to apply for tax-exempt status
may file a Form 1024 with the Service, but there
is no regulatory requirement that they do so.
These organizations, however, are required to file
an annual information return (Form 990).72 There
have been administrative problems when organiza-
tions have filed a Form 990 but have not filed a
Form 1024, so in many cases tax-exempt organiza-
tions file the Form 1024 to avoid administrative
70389 U.S. 299 (1967).
71See I.R.C. x 505(c) (requiring 501(c)(9), (17), and (20) orga-
nizations to file for recognition). No similar requirement exists
for 501(c)(4), (c)(5), or (c)(6) organizations.
72I.R.C. x 6033(a).
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headaches. Even if an organization files a Form
1024 to avoid a Form 990 filing issue, however, it
can wait until several months after the close of its
taxable year to do so.73
Since organizations are not required to file a Form
1024, there is no automatic time at which the Service
examines whether an organization meets the regula-
tory requirements of the statute. While the Form
990 provides significant information to the Service
that could be examined by the Service to ensure com-
pliance, that form is often filed too late to be used as a
means of guarding against abusive planning by inde-
pendent groups, particularly in the fast-paced world
of campaign activity.
Ellen Aprill, in her recent work arguing for a
requirement that section 501(c)(4) organizations
file an application for exemption, points out that
there are reasons besides bureaucratic ease that
favor such regulation.74 She notes that section
501(c)(4) organizations that engage in lobbying
are only allowed to lobby if it is related to the
exempt purpose of the organization, and an organi-
zation’s purpose is usually set out in the application
for exemption. In order to police the lobbying pro-
vision, the Service needs to be able to compare
the Form 990 to the application for exemption.75
For all of these reasons, the Treasury therefore
should implement regulations requiring all section
501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations with contri-
butions or expenditures above a high threshold (ap-
proximately $100,000) to file a Form 1024.76 In
those cases, Treasury could require the Form 1024
to be filed within six months of an organization’s
incorporation. In addition, if an organization has
over $500,000, of contributions or expenditures, the
organization should be required to file a Form 1024
within 30 days of its receipt or expenditure of a total
of $500,000 since that level of financial resources indi-
cates both the capacity to complete the form in an
expeditious fashion and the possibility for significant
abuse absent such a short filing deadline. These limits
are intentionally set high so that only sophisticated
parties will be subject to the tighter deadlines.77
B. Review of Form 1024
To ensure requiring applications leads to actual ver-
ification of claimed tax-exempt status, the Service
should also set up procedures to quickly review
Form 1024s that are filed based on the proposed regu-
lations. If a tax-exempt organization is required to file
a Form 1024 because of large donations or expendi-
tures, the IRS should examine the Form 1024 within
two weeks, and provide an initial determination with
regard to status within 30 days of receiving the Form
1024. This will provide certainty to organizations
and reduce the possibility that organizations will
later be reclassified as section 527 political organiza-
tions. Furthermore, the Service should publish the
names of all tax-exempt organization that have been
approved by the Service. Such prompt review should
not prejudice applicant groups, especially since
under existing law, an organization that is denied sec-
tion 501(c)(4) status has significant administrative and
judicial remedies, and can appeal the Service’s deter-
mination in federal court.78
C. Require disclosure of contributions
and expenditures over $25,000
The Treasury should promulgate regulations requi-
ring tax-exempt organizations, excluding 501(c)(3)
organizations, to disclose contributions and non-
employee expenditures in excess of $25,000.79
Organizations should be required to disclose the
73The Form 990 is due the fifteenth day of the fifth month fol-
lowing the end of the organization’s taxable year. This means
that an organization formed six months before an election
could wait until eleven months after the election to file its
Form 990. In addition, an organization can seek a sixth
month extension with which to file its 990. See FSA
200046038 (discussing problem of organizations filing Form
990 without having previously filed a Form 1024).
74Aprill, supra note 9, at 402.
75Id.
76This regulation is well within the Treasury’s authority. In
addition to the authority under x 7805, x 6033 specifically pro-
vides that x 501 organizations must file returns. It also gives the
Secretary authority to require ‘‘other information’’ and to
require additional ‘‘forms or regulations.’’ The Secretary
could easily determine that the filing of Form 1024 would assist
in ‘‘carrying out the internal revenue laws’’ in this area. See
I.R.C. x 6033(a)(1).
77Here, as with other proposals in this article, the Treasury will
need to create anti-abuse rules to prevent individuals or groups
from disaggregating contributions or expenditures in order to
avoid these rules, but such rules are common in tax statutes
and regulations. See, e.g., I.R.C. x 4911(f) (providing rules
for aggregating the finances of affiliated groups for purposes
of applying the elective expenditure limit on lobbying by x
501(c)(3) organizations).
78For example, see Christian Coalition International v. U.S.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 437, 438 (E.D. Va. 2001).
79After notice and comment, one might decide that this amount
should be set even higher. The point here is to address the infor-
mation, anti-corruption, and coherence concerns addressed in
this article. It might be that an even higher threshold will
accomplish those goals. For example, Form 990 currently
requires disclosure of employee salaries over $100,000. Form
990, Part VII.
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contribution and expenditure within seven days.
The purpose of this regulation is to provide voters
with sufficient information regarding the organiza-
tion’s activities, to inform voters about election
activities, to enable the Service to enforce provi-
sions dealing with tax-exempt organizations, to
help reduce corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption, and to help create a coherent structure for
tax-exempt organizations by discouraging organi-
zations from improperly manipulating formation
choice in order to avoid the disclosure provisions
in section 527.
The Treasury could easily implement regulations
regarding the disclosure of expenditures, and the
regulation would not be overly onerous with regard
to major organizations. Implementation with regard
to the disclosure of the name, city, state, and amount
of contribution of donors is a little more problem-
atic. The critical question is whether provisions in
the Internal Revenue Code designed to protect a tax-
payer’s privacy would prohibit the Service from
issuing regulations requiring an organization to
publically disclose its large donors.80
Tax-exempt organizations are already required to
provide on Schedule B of Form 990 the name,
address, and amount of donation of every person
who donates over $5,000 to the organization.81 Sec-
tion 6104 also requires tax-exempt organizations to
make the Form 990 available to the public, but the
organization may redact the donor segment of the
Form 990 from its public disclosure (and the IRS
apparently must do so before it makes such returns
public). An easy statutory fix would be to amend
section 6104 and provide that only donors under
$25,000 may be redacted from the publicly released
Form 990 for non-section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
organizations, and that disclosure must occur on a
more timely basis. But Treasury need not wait for
a statutory fix. Instead, it can and should implement
a similar (although not identical) rule through
regulation.
While there are provisions in the Code that pro-
tect taxpayer return information, these provisions
do not foreclose the regulations I advocate. Section
6104(b) provides that ‘‘[n]othing in this subsection
shall authorize the Secretary to disclose the name
or address of any contributor to any organization
or trust.’’ (emphasis added). The Treasury regula-
tion explaining section 6104 provides that the
‘‘names and addresses of contributors to an organi-
zation.shall not be made available for public
inspection under Section 6104(b).’’82 The statute
and regulation, therefore, prohibit the Secretary
from disclosing information obtained by the Secre-
tary under section 6104, and this would clearly pro-
hibit the Secretary (and therefore the IRS) from
using section 6104 as authority for disclosing the
donor information contained on the Form 990. It
does not prohibit the Treasury, through regulation,
from requiring tax-exempt organizations themselves
to make disclosure to the public regarding informa-
tion that might be contained on the Form 990. The
distinction is an important one. The statute prohibits
the Secretary or other IRS employees from using
section 6104 as authority for disclosing information
on the Form 990 that is deemed private. It does not
prohibit the promulgation of regulations requiring
taxpayers to disclose information to the public, as
long as such regulation is within the Secretary’s
authority.
The limited scope of the prohibition in section
6104 makes sense when read in context. Section
6104 sets out requirements for public disclosure of
return information by a taxpayer. It requires taxpay-
ers to make their Form 990s public. Tax-exempt
organizations understandably wanted to keep their
large donors private. Public availability of Form
990 was designed to promote transparency in tax-
exempt organizations and to ensure that tax-exempt
status was not abused. When considering the bal-
ance between public disclosure of the Form 990
donors and keeping the donors private, Congress
chose to allow tax-exempt organizations to redact
information concerning donors. That balance, how-
ever, was limited to the specific circumstance in
section 6104 where broad disclosure was required
of all section 501 and 527 organizations. This deter-
mination regarding the balance between privacy and
public disclosure was made before disclosure provi-
sions were added to section 527 and before some
tax-exempt organizations were being used as a
mechanism to circumvent congressionally passed
disclosure provisions in section 527.
Similarly, section 6103 of the Code, which pro-
hibits the Secretary from disclosing return informa-
tion, might be read to prohibit a regulation requiring
disclosure. Section 6103, with many exceptions,
80See I.R.C. x 6103.
81See Schedule B, Form 990.
82Treas. Reg. x 301.6104(b)-1(b) (emphasis added).
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requires the confidentiality of return information,
and prohibits the disclosure of return information
by the Secretary or his employees to the public. Sec-
tion 6103 contains numerous exceptions including
an exception for disclosure in judicial proceedings,
criminal investigations, and for tax administration
purposes.83
The definition of return information is very
broad. Return information includes:
a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or
amount of his income, payments, receipts,
deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabil-
ities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, overassessments, or tax pay-
ments, whether the taxpayer’s return was, is
being, or will be examined or subject to
other investigation or processing, or any
other data, received by, recorded by, prepared
by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary
with respect to a return or with respect to the
determination of the existence, or possible
existence, of liability (or the amount thereof)
of any person under this title for any tax, pen-
alty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposi-
tion, or offense.84
Despite the broad definition of return informa-
tion, my proposal, which advocates disclosure by
the tax-exempt organization of contributions over
$25,000 within seven days of the donation, does
not run afoul of section 6103. Although this amount
will likely be included on a taxpayer’s Form 990,
the regulation at issue would require the public post-
ing of the information well before it was filed with
the Service. Since the Form 990 will not yet have
been filed, the information is not ‘‘received by,
recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected
by the Secretary with respect to a return.’’ The reg-
ulation would instead require disclosure of the
information before it is return information, so sec-
tion 6103 is not applicable. The Treasury still
needs independent authority to issue the regulation
requiring disclosure, but the regulation would not
be in conflict with section 6103.85
Even if the information at issue is return informa-
tion, a regulation requiring that a section 501(c)(4)
organization publically disclose its donors would
not violate section 6103. The circuits are split
with regard to cases interpreting the breadth and
scope of section 6103. Some circuits have held
that the Service may disclose return information if
that information is public. Under these rulings, the
Service may disclose the name of a taxpayer
involved in a criminal prosecution, if that name
has been made public.86 Other cases, however,
have taken a strict reading of section 6103 and
have not allowed the Service to disclose return
information even if that information is in the public
record.87 All of these cases, however, center on the
fact that the Service made the disclosure. Section
6103 is written to include disclosure by government
employees. There is no violation if the information
is not released by the Secretary or his employees.
My proposed regulation would require tax-ex-
empt organizations to disclose the name and amount
of contribution of their donors. The donors them-
selves are not the taxpayer at issue, and those donors
are not protected by section 6103. Rather, section
6103 protects the tax return of the tax-exempt orga-
nization.88
Nothing in section 6103, however, prohibits the
Secretary from issuing a regulation requiring a
tax-exempt organization to disclose certain infor-
mation to the public, as long as the Secretary has
the authority to issue the regulation. It may appear
83I.R.C. x 6103(h), (i), (k).
84I.R.C. x 6103(b)(2)(A). Section 6103 was passed in 1976 in
response to fears that the Service was collecting mass amounts
of information on taxpayers and that this data might be used for
political advantage. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). See General Explanation of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Dec. 29, 1976, JCS-33-75, at p. 313.
85Since the Form 990 lists all donors who contributed more than
$5,000, once the Form 990 is filed, disclosure by the Service of
donors to the organization might violate x 6103 because once
the Form 990 is filed, the information regarding the name and
amount of a donor’s contribution that is on the From 990 is
return information.
86These cases generally arise when the Service wants to issue a
press release involving a taxpayer who had been convicted of a
tax crime. Since the proceedings are public record, Courts have
argued that the disclosure of the tax crime is not a violation of
section 6103. See Lampert v. U.S., 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.
1988)(allowing disclosure).
87See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1323 (5th Cir. 1997)
(finding violation even if information is in the public record
if the tax return was the source of the information); Rodgers
v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding violation
of the disclosure of return information even if the information is
public).
88As discussed earlier, in my view x 6103 does not apply in this
instance because the information being sought is not return
information. The Secretary cannot disclose the donor portion
of the Form 990, but the information being sought is provided
before the taxpayer files a Form 990.
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disingenuous to argue that the Secretary can require
disclosure through regulation when the Secretary
could not disclose the information independently.
Section 6103 prohibits any government employee
from ‘‘disclos[ing] any return or return information
obtained by him in any manner in connection with
his service as such an officer or an employee or oth-
erwise or under the provisions of this section’’ [em-
phasis added]. One could argue that ‘‘in any
manner’’ would prohibit the Secretary from issuing
a regulation requiring section tax-exempt organiza-
tions themselves to disclose donors over $25,000,
since such donors appear on the Form 990 (especially
in light of section 6103). Thus a regulation requiring
disclosure of donors to a section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion would be the ‘‘manner’’ by which the govern-
ment made the disclosure. The ‘‘in any manner’’
provision, however, still requires a disclosure by an
employee of the government. A regulation issued
by the Secretary requiring as a condition of tax-
exempt status that organizations disclose donors
over $25,000 is simply not a disclosure by an officer
or an employee of the government.89
As discussed earlier, the Treasury has the author-
ity to create rules governing section 501(c)(4),
(c)(5), and (c)(6) organizations, and is responsible
for enforcing these provisions. Current regulations
take an expansive view of the statutory term ‘‘exclu-
sively.’’ The Service has an interest in ensuring
compliance with this expansive view and can rea-
sonably make the judgment that public disclosure
will serve as a better compliance tool than addi-
tional audits or further internal compliance. Nothing
in sections 6103 or 6104 prohibit the Secretary from
taking such action.90
Finally, although in my view sections 6103 and
6104 do not prohibit the Secretary from issuing reg-
ulations requiring disclosure, the regulation could
avoid any conflict with sections 6103 and 6104 by
placing the burden of disclosure on the donor to
the organization, instead of on the organization
itself. This has significant administrative deficien-
cies, but disclosure by the donor would clearly not
implicate section 6103 since it would not involve
the disclosure of ‘‘return information’’ under section
6103.
The Treasury should therefore promulgate a reg-
ulation that would require all tax-exempt organiza-
tions to keep records of donors who contribute
more than $25,000 to the organization. These
organizations would also be required to make avail-
able to the public, upon request, the name, city and
state of each donor. They would not be required to
file this information with the Service, but would
be required to provide the information on a timely
basis to those requesting the information. The orga-
nizations could be relieved of the requirement to
provide the information upon request if they made
the information available to the public through
other means on a timely basis (for example, by post-
ing the information on the Internet).91
A disclosure requirement at this level has the
benefit of ensuring that small organizations are
not overly burdened and would not be overly inva-
sive for donors. In order to provide more coherence
in this area, the Service could also relax its require-
ments with regard to the disclosure provisions under
section 527. Even though section 527 provides for
the disclosure of contributions of $200, and expen-
ditures of $500, Treasury could, through regulation,
raise the disclosure amounts and indicate that it
will not take action against organizations that dis-
close contributions of $5,000 or expenditures of
$10,000. Raising these thresholds would reduce
the disclosure obligations for section 527 organiza-
tions and therefore make section 501(c)(4) status
less attractive.
My recommended regulation requiring limited
donor disclosure by some tax-exempt entities
would provide information to voters regarding the
supporters of the organizations and allow for a
check on the possibility of corruption from large
donors. Although the Supreme Court has indicated
89Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269 (7th
Cir. 1995) (finding railroad employee not subject to x 6103).
In its discussion, however, the court noted that ‘‘Congress set
out to limit disclosure by persons who get tax returns in the
course of public business-employees of the IRS, state employ-
ees to whom the IRS makes authorized disclosures, and private
persons who obtain return information from the IRS with
strings attached.’’ The idea behind the section is to protect pri-
vate return information. Section 6103 is concerned about the
source of the information and the person involved in the
disclosure.
90In fact, to the extent x 6103 was designed to prevent the Serv-
ice from using information it possesses in a negative way, the
public disclosure of the information by the tax-exempt organi-
zation ensures that everyone had access to the same information
and that the information cannot be disclosed by the IRS for
political reasons or on a selective basis.
91Similar regulations already exist with regard to some of the
disclosure requirements for tax-exempt organizations. The reg-
ulations allow tax-exempt organizations to meet certain public
disclosure requirements by making documents publically avail-
able on the Internet. See Treas. Reg. x 301.6104(d)-2.
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that contributions to independent organizations are
not corrupting, the landscape has changed consider-
ably in recent years, especially since Citizens
United was decided. As independent organizations
play a greater role in the election system, the chance
of non-coordinated spending having a corrupting
influence increases.92
There are obviously ways in which sophisticated
parties could seek ways to circumvent the regula-
tions I propose. Any regulation requiring disclosure
must have anti-abuse provisions to deal with the
aggregation of contributions, tracing of contribu-
tions, and the use of trusts to hide contributions.
In addition, it is possible that taxable entities
could be used as a mechanism for avoiding cam-
paign finance disclosure; those seeking to influence
elections while avoiding disclosure may therefore
shift from tax-exempt organizations to taxable orga-
nizations in order to avoid any new disclosure
requirements.93 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United makes the use of for-profit organi-
zations even more tempting, as exemplified by the
recent revelation that a Limited Liability Company
made a $1,000,000 contribution to a SuperPAC sup-
porting Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign.94
This incident highlights that the availability of alter-
native vehicles for campaign spending (although in
that instance the ultimate source of the funds came
to light relatively quickly, albeit not because of
legally required disclosure). I recognize that disclo-
sure obligations for tax-exempt organizations may
encourage the use of alternative campaign vehicles.
My goal in this article is to suggest a quick regula-
tory fix to the abuse of section 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and
(c)(6). More sweeping recommendations for creat-
ing a coherent disclosure regime, including further
regulation of taxable entities, are beyond the
scope of this article but might also be considered
by Treasury.
D. Provide safe harbor of ‘‘primary’’
under section 501(c)(4)
If the disclosure provisions apply to other tax-ex-
empt organizations, there will no longer be a strong
incentive to take aggressive positions with regard to
the term ‘‘primary purpose’’ under section
501(c)(4). Treasury could, however, also promul-
gate regulations creating a safe harbor for primary
purpose under section 501(c)(4). The safe harbor
would provide that organizations that spend no
more than some fixed percentage on campaign inter-
vention (say 25%) would be entitled to 501(c)(4)
status, removing some of the uncertainty in this
area for more cautious organizations seeking to
comply with the law in good faith.95
E. Allow for external complaints regarding
abuse of tax-exempt status
In light of the abusive planning by some tax-
exempt organizations, possible accusations of polit-
ical manipulation by the Service, the secrecy
regarding tax administration, and the lack of gov-
ernment resources, the Service should set up a pub-
lic complaint process that would allow for the filing
of complaints about the activities of tax-exempt
organizations. The abuse of tax-exempt status has
serious implications for the conduct of elections
and democratic institutions. There is strong evi-
dence that tax-exempt organizations are being mis-
used as a means of avoiding campaign disclosure
provisions, contrary to congressional intent when
it added disclosure provisions to section 527. An
external complaint process would provide confi-
dence to the public that alleged abuses will be inves-
tigated, and that the decisions whether to investigate
an entity are not based on partisanship by the
Service.
Currently, individuals and organizations wishing
to make complaints about an organization’s vio-
lation of its exempt purpose may write letters to
the Service outlining their complaints or file a
one-page complaint form (Form 13909). There is,
however, no public formal complaint process, no
92The corruption rationale, however, is not required to uphold
the constitutionality of a regulation requiring disclosure. See
Citizens United, 103 S. Ct. at 914.
93See Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Enti-
ties: Are They the Next ‘‘Loophole’’?, 6 First Amend. L.
Rev. 41 (2007).
94SeeNicholas Confessore, PAC Linked to Romney Gets a Mys-
tery Gift, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2011, at A13.
95Section 501(h) is an example of a safe harbor provision, and it
applies to x 501(c)(3) organizations engaged in lobbying. It sets
a relatively low threshold and in my view one that is too low in
this context. Since my view is that x 501(c)(4) should apply to
those organizations that are not x 527 organizations, I would
read primary for x 501(c)(4) as the inverse of primary for x
527 political organizations. Thus in my view, the correct read-
ing of primary in x 501(c)(4) for regulatory purposes is a pur-
pose that is the organizations majority purpose. I do,
however, believe that money is only one measure of an organi-
zation’s purpose and that is why I have recommended a safe
harbor at 25%.
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standing for third parties to bring complaints, and
no requirement that the Service investigate or act
on the complaints. Indeed, the IRS, bound by sec-
tion 6103, appears to be of the view it is not permit-
ted to discuss if and how it handles any given
complaint, unless that complaint results in actual
revocation of tax-exempt status (which revocation
the IRS is permitted to publicize). This is problem-
atic from the standpoint of transparency, because
interested members of the public have no way of
discovering what action the Service has (or has
not) taken in response to a complaint, and why.
The Service should therefore investigate the feasi-
bility of creating a formal, public complaint process
that would allow for the submission of complaints
and provide for the review of those complaints in
a timely, non-partisan manner.
F. Nonpartisan enforcement process
One of the biggest problems in this area is creat-
ing an enforcement process that has credibility and
keeps the Service out of partisan politics. The best
solution is an independent commission made up of
a rotating group of long-term employees from the
Service.96 Creating a truly independent commission
would require congressional action. The Treasury,
however, could set up an independent process
within the Service to create a formal, non-partisan
process for investigating complaints about tax-
exempt organizations and political intervention.97
Specifically, the Service could set up an inde-
pendent division within the Service to investigate
complaints regarding political intervention by
tax-exempt organizations. The division would
examine complaints made by taxpayers as well
as complaints referred to the division by the
Exempt Organizations Division. A rotating group
of career employees would investigate complaints
and refer credible complaints to a board. The
board would consist of a rotating group of career
IRS employees with more than 10 years of expe-
rience and could also include employees from the
Inspector General’s Office. The idea is to create
non-partisan expertise and also to shield the
group from political pressure and intervention.98
Using career employees instead of appointments
by party representatives helps avoid the deadlock
that may happen when there are an equal number
of people appointed to a review board from each
party.
G. Possible examination of ethical issues
Individuals who practice before the Service are
subject to the ethical rules promulgated by the Serv-
ice. These regulations appear in what is referred to as
Circular 230, and these regulations have been used by
the Service to reduce aggressive positions by taxpay-
ers, especially in the tax shelter area. Similar regula-
tions could be promulgated with regard to advice
given to tax-exempt organizations. In most cases, tax-
payers and tax-exempt organizations are receiving
assistance by tax professionals. Circular 230 has sev-
eral current rules that might apply to aggressive plan-
ning with regard to formation choice. For example,
section 10.22 of Circular 230 requires practitioners
to exercise due diligence with regard to filing with
the Service. This means a practitioner should not
file a Form 990 return for a section 501(c)(4) organi-
zation or help create a section 501(c)(4) organization,
in circumstances where the organization does not
comport with the statute—even if it is unlikely that
the Service will challenge the organization’s status.
A practitioner’s signature operates as a type of seal
of approval, signifying that he or she believes the
organization’s activities are proper under the Internal
Revenue Code. Moreover, in reaching this conclu-
sion, the practitioner may not simply rely on a client’s
representation that it will engage in social welfare
when the practitioner has reason to know that the
information is incorrect. The practitioner has a
basic duty to make reasonable inquiries.99
In addition, the Service has issued more stringent
guidelines for practitioners advising on tax shelter
transactions.100 The Service could create similar
guidelines for practitioners forming non-501(c)(3)
tax-exempt organizations. These requirements could
provide that the practitioner receive clarity regarding
the organization’s purpose and its activities before
96See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches
and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for
Democracy, 95 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1359–62 (2007).
97The Service already sets up independent panels of career
employees to investigate political intervention by (c)(3) organi-
zations. See Internal Revenue Serv., Political Activities Com-
pliance Initiative: Procedures for 501(c)(3) organizations
(2005).
98For a more thorough discussion of how this might work in the
(c)(3) context see, Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by
Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous
for Democracy, 95 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1330, 1361 (2007).
99See Circular 230, x 10.34(d).
100Circular 230, x 10.35.
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filing documents with regard to the organization.
The regulations could also require practitioners to
examine various activities by the tax-exempt enti-
ties before filing the Form 990 to be sure that the
organization actually complies with its status.
Using rules in the tax shelter context as a model,
the regulations could require the tax professional
to reach a conclusion whether a tax-exempt organi-
zation’s activities are really social welfare activities.
The practitioner would then be required to reach an
opinion that the organization was primarily engaged
in social welfare activity under 501(c)(4) (or com-
parable purpose under other sections of the Code).
Such a regulation would be burdensome, but a
similar regulation in the tax shelter context has
been helpful in limiting tax shelter abuse. Further
regulating practitioners may be another means of
controlling the abuse in this area.
H. Constitutionality of regulating tax-exempt
organizations
The regulations I propose here are constitutional
and do not violate the First Amendment. The power
of Congress to condition tax-exempt status has been
thoroughly examined pre-Citizens United,101 and
Ellen Aprill addresses this issue post-Citizens
United in her article appearing in this issue.102
Because of her full treatment of the constitutional
issue, I address it only briefly here.
In creating a comprehensive tax system, Con-
gress had the power to determine that some types
of organizations should be treated differently—
more preferentially—than others. In deciding
which organizations deserved preferential treat-
ment, Congress could set out rules that those entities
have to follow in order to receive the preferential
treatment.103 Therefore, Congress has the power
to determine what activities enable an organization
to qualify for tax-exempt status, and may require
that such organizations meet certain conditions to
obtain or retain that status.104
Moreover, in Regan v. Taxpayers With Represen-
tation, the Court upheld a restriction in 501(c)(3)
that prohibited (c)(3) organizations from engaging
in substantial lobbying.105 Restrictions on lobbying
impose a far greater limitation on First Amend-
ment activity than disclosure requirements. In
Taxpayers with Representation (TWR), the Court
rejected TWR’s claims that the restriction in section
501(c)(3) limiting lobbying for section 501(c)(3)
organizations violated the First Amendment. The
Court concluded that Congress did not deny TWR
the right to receive deductible contributions for
other purposes, nor did it deny TWR any indepen-
dent benefit based on its intention to lobby.106
Instead, Congress ‘‘merely refused to pay for the
lobbying out of public monies.’’107
101This section summarizes some of my earlier work on this
topic. See Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section
527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 611, 638
(2003); Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches
and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for
Democracy, 95 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1330. 1342–1347 (2007); see
also Daniel Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation
and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
102Aprill, supra note 9.
103See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450–51
(1991)(power to discriminate is inherent in power to tax);
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983)(the legislature has ‘‘great freedom’’ in taxation classifi-
cation, and ‘‘the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination.’’).
104Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Bob
Jones case involved two churches. Goldsboro Christian Schools
admitted that it had racially discriminatory policies. Bob Jones
argued that its policy against interracial dating and interracial
marriage was not discriminatory because it applied to all
races. Id. at 605. In addition, the Court specifically rejected tax-
payer’s argument that since the discrimination was based on a
deeply held religious belief, the organization was entitled to
tax-exempt status. Id. at 603.
105‘‘We have no doubt but that this statute is within Congress’
broad power in this area. TWR contends that x 501(c)(3) orga-
nizations could better advance their charitable purposes if they
were permitted to engage in substantial lobbying. This may
well be true. But Congress—not TWR or this Court—has the
authority to determine whether the advantage the public
would receive from additional lobbying by charities is worth
the money the public would pay to subsidize that lobbying,
and other disadvantages that might accompany that lobbying.’’
Id. at 550. Outside of the tax context, the Supreme Court has
upheld statutes that condition the grant of federal funds on a
recipient’s willingness to comply with the restrictions in the
grant, even if those restrictions would otherwise violate the
First Amendment. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(upholding provisions prohibiting Title X grant recipients
from, among other things, referring a pregnant woman to an
abortion provider as a method of family planning); but see
LSC v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)(finding unconstitu-
tional a condition on legal services funding that prohibited a
lawyer who received funds from challenging the validity of
welfare laws. Lawyers could argue that the client was entitled
to benefits under the law, but could not challenge the validity
of the law); Federal Communications Commission v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)(finding unconstitutional





The regulations I propose here mainly involve the
disclosure of contributors to and expenditures of tax-
exempt organizations. In Citizens United, the Court
noted that disclosure and disclaimer provisions
might burden the ability to speak, but they do not pre-
vent anyone from speaking.108 The Court explained
that disclosure provisions are therefore subject to a
lower level of scrutiny, ‘‘‘exacting scrutiny,’ which
requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclo-
sure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ gov-
ernment interest.’’109 The Court recognized that
there might be situations where disclosure might sub-
ject people to threats or harassment and that in such
situations the disclosure provisions might be uncon-
stitutional as applied to those individuals.110 It
found in that case, however, that the government’s
interest in informing voters was sufficient to support
disclosure absent concrete evidence of such threats,
harassment, or other negative effects.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court recognized
that there was evidence in the record in McConnell
that ‘‘independent groups were running election-
related advertisements ‘while hiding behind dubious
and misleading names.’’’111 Again quoting its deci-
sion in McConnell, the Court recognized that the
disclosure provisions served an important govern-
ment interest of helping citizens ‘‘make informed
choices in the political marketplace.’’112 The Court
concluded by noting that ‘‘disclosure is a less restric-
tive alternative to more comprehensive regulations
of speech.’’
Thus, after Citizens United, there is even more
indication that the Court is willing to accept cam-
paign disclosure provisions. Disclosure provisions
are justified by both the corruption concern outlined
in Buckley and by a more general voter information
interest, set out in both McConnell and Citizens
United.113
In light of Congress’s general taxing power, the
decision in Taxpayers with Representation uphold-
ing conditions on tax-exempt status, and the holding
in Citizens United upholding the constitutionality of
disclosure provisions, the regulations I propose here
are constitutional and do not violate the First
Amendment.114
IV. CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code is not the ideal place to
regulate the campaign activities of organizations. The
Service is not designed well to handle the political
thicket that naturally comes from investigating orga-
nizations involved in political campaigns. The Serv-
ice, however, has been placed in the thicket by
Congress. Congress passed disclosure provisions in
section 527 and those provisions have created incen-
tives for political operatives to manipulate and abuse
the system. Instead of having to audit organizations at
very sensitive times, the Treasury should create a reg-
ulatory system that decreases the need for the Service
to investigate tax-exempt entities that intervene in
political campaigns. A system that requires broad
based disclosure by all tax-exempt organizations
except 501(c)(3)s will make it easier for the Service
to stay out of politics. To the extent some policing
of disclosure provisions is necessary, the reforms I
suggest make that enforcementmuch easier—entities
either properly disclosed or they did not. These pro-
posals do not require the Service to engage in the
108Id.
109Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citing Buckley 424 U.S. at
64, 66, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231–232).
110Id. at 914–15. Historically, such fears have been by under-
represented groups who feared reprisal from the majority. See
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)(denied state the
right to compel NAACP to turn over membership lists); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)(not required to disclose name
on handbill seeking equal rights because plaintiff had legitimate
fear of serious reprisal). This historic nature of these cases evi-
dences a concern about serious reprisals that had the risk of seri-
ous and even life threatening harm.
111Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell, 540
U.S. at 197).
112Id.
113For a thorough discussion of Campaign Finance Disclosure
post-Citizens United, see Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance
Disclosure 2.0, 9 Election L.J. 273 (2010).
114As discussed earlier, some have argued that the facts and cir-
cumstances test violates the First Amendment because it is
overly vague. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, When Statutory
Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to
Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity
Unconstitutional?, 13U. Pa. J. Const. L. 867, 885 (2011)(ex-
amining facts and circumstances test and vagueness issue);
Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Challenges to ‘‘Facts and Circumstan-
ces’’—a Standard Whose Time has Passed?, 20 Tax. of
Exempts 5, at n.7–9 (Mar./Apr. 2010); Benjamin M. Leff,
‘‘Sit Down and Count the Cost’’: A Framework for Constitu-
tionally Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban,
28 Va. Tax Rev. 673, 699 (2009). A constitutional analysis
of the facts and circumstances test is outside the scope of this
article, but any vagueness concerns apply more in the section
501(c)(3) context where the test is used to prohibit a section
501(c)(3) organization from engaging in the activity. In the sec-
tions 501(c)(4) and 527 context the test is used to determine an
organization’s primary purpose, which serves as a basketing
function, not as a prohibition.
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE AND TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES 447
same level of intervention in an organization’s activ-
ities and thus protect it from accusations of partisan
selective enforcement.
The new regulations I suggest will disincentivize
those who are seeking an improper organizational
form to avoid disclosure form doing so and will pro-
vide better information to voters regarding the fund-
ing of independent groups. It is not the ideal way of
regulating nonprofits’ campaign related activities,
but it is a step that can be taken quickly, without
congressional action. A quick repair to the regula-
tory plumbing will stop the leaks in the current sys-
tem from becoming a flood.
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